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Abstract
What is the proper degree of central bank transparency? This pa-
per investigates the issue in a framework characterized by: a) common
uncertainty on potential output, and b) imperfect knowledge of the
central bank target (and inference of the true policy reaction func-
tion) by the private sector. We show that full transparency is socially
beneficial under a variety of parametrizations. Our results confirm,
in a different set up, those of Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), and
Svensson (2006).
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy transparency has considerably increased across countries in
the last decade. This development is probably linked with the fact that many
central banks have recently adopted (more or less explicitly) an inflation-
targeting regime, where it is essential for the central bank to be able to
anchor private sector’s expectations. In a forward-looking environment, it
would seem natural to be pro-transparency, as extensively argued in Wood-
ford (2003).
However, Morris and Shin (2002) have seriously challenged this belief
and opened a lively debate in the economic literature1. They argue that
there can be a cost in providing more accurate public information, as agents
may overreact to such information. In this framework, agents formulate ex-
pectations based on the underlying fundamentals, but a coordination motive
arises from strategic complementarity in their actions. As a result, agents
may be too sensitive to forecast errors in public information. Svensson
(2006) underlines that Morris and Shin’s result in favor of opaqueness can
be misleading, because it was obtained for a very particular functional form
of social welfare and for unreasonable parameter values. Morris and Shin
modeled public information as a signal of exogenous disturbances; however,
economic agents mainly receive endogenous signals, i.e. signals about the
state of the economy which depend on economic policy objectives, actions
and on public and private assessments of the overall economic conditions.
Examples of such signals are the short-term policy rate set by central banks
or its economic forecasts. The introduction of transparency issues along
these lines leads Walsh (2007) to show that more economic transparency is
not always welfare beneficial. The optimal degree of transparency depends
on the relative quality of the signals available to the central bank and the
1Actually, Morris and Shin’s paper was commented and discussed also outside the
academia. The Economist, for example, in 2004 published an article which was inspired
by the result found by Morris and Shin and whose title was ”It’s Not Always Good To
Talk”.
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private sector and on the relative central bank’s ability to forecast aggre-
gate demand and supply shocks: if the central bank obtains more accurate
signals on cost shocks, optimal transparency increases, whereas if it obtains
more accurate signals on demand shocks, optimal transparency decreases.
In modeling the information structure within the private sector, Walsh al-
lows for firm-specific shocks and follows Cornand and Heinemann (2006),
who introduce a rationale for partial transparency, in the sense of partial
release of information. They find that extensive release of public informa-
tion may induce excessive sensitivity of agents’ expectations to noises in
public information (as in Morris and Shin). However, if public information
can be released only to a proportion of agents, there is only a limited effect
on the higher-order expectations, thereby avoiding coordination failures and
restoring positive values of (partial) transparency.
In this paper we investigate whether central bank’s political transparency
is desirable in presence of incomplete information about the state of the
economy. We will assume that the central bank and the private sector
share the same incomplete information on potential output. Moreover, the
private sector does not observe the policy targets and cannot exactly in-
fer the policy reaction function, linking the choice of the policy instrument
to the final objectives. Orphanides (2001, 2003) widely documented the
relevance a common noise in the measure of potential output for central
bank’s policy. Cuckierman and Lippi (2005) showed that, even if the policy-
makers efficiently estimate potential output, this does not avoid persistent
retrospective policy errors. An interesting question is, therefore, if a more
transparent central bank can limit the welfare cost of having incomplete
information about potential output.
From a methodological point of view, this paper contributes to the liter-
ature which analyzes problems of incomplete information in DSGE models.
In most papers it has been assumed an information structure featuring a
common information set for the private sector larger than the central bank’s
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one (Svensson and Woodford (2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2008)) 2. We
start by observing that policy objectives and intentions are not always re-
vealed explicitly and truthfully to the public. Hence, we assume asymmetric
information about policy targets in favor of the central bank and we analyze
whether disclosing such policy targets may be beneficial in a framework of
incomplete common information on potential output.
The paper is organized as follows: we describe the model in section 2
and we solve it in its state-space form in section 3. In section 4 we show the
numerical properties of the model and check the robustness of our findings.
Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 The model
We will focus on the informational side of a microfounded DSGE model
featuring nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. The supply-side
of the economy is modeled according to a New Keynesian Phillips curve:3.
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1− ωβ)(1 − ω)
ω
κ (yt − yt) +
(1− ωβ)(1− ω)
ω
st (1)
where β is the discount factor, 1−ω is the constant fraction of firms adjusting
their prices (Calvo’s parameter), κ is the sum of the coefficient on relative
risk aversion and the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply, and st is
a cost-push shock. The cost-push shock is assumed to be an AR(1) process:
s t = ρsst−1 + εt (2)
Since only cost-push shocks posit policy trade-offs, we follow Faust and
Svensson (2002) and Walsh (2006, 2007)) and work with a simplified version
2Svensson and Woodford (2004) claim that the only case of asymmetric information in
which it is coherent to assume a common information set for all members of private sector
is the case in which the private sector has complete information about the state of the
economy and the central bank does not. In fact, only in this case ”the model’s equations
can be expressed in terms of aggregate equations that refer to only a single private sector
information set, while at the same time, these model equations are treated as structural,
and hence invariant under the alternative policies”.
3See the Appendix for a quick derivation of the NKPC and Woodford (2003) for an
extensive discussion of the complete microfoundation of DSGE models.
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of the demand side. We assume that the central bank has imperfect control
over the level of output (treated as a policy instrument, see below) and, in
turn, over the output gap. More precisely, the following stochastic structure
is adopted:
a) an autoregressive error term ηt makes the intended output gap y
I
t −yt
deviate from the actual output gap y t − yt;
y t − yt = y
I
t − yt + ηt ηt = ρηηt−1 + µt (3)
b) potential output is autoregressive: yt = ρyyt−1 + gt;
c) The central bank and the private sector share a distorted observation
of the true potential output because of a measurement error:
y
◦
t = yt + νt νt ∼WN
(
0, σ2ν
)
(4)
Considering y t as the policy instrument of the central bank is only a simpli-
fying assumption. In the standard case of an IS equation derived from first
principles, with consumption dynamics depending on real interest rates, we
could treat either inflation or output as a control variable and subsequently
derive the interest rate which is coherent with the prescribed relationship
between output and inflation.4
The central bank is assumed to minimize the following loss function:
Lt =
1
2
[
(πt − π
∗
t )
2 + α (yt − yt)
2
]
(5)
where π∗t is a stochastic inflation target, with the following AR(1) represen-
tation:
π∗t = ρpiπ
∗
t−1 + ζt (6)
The assumption of a stochastic inflation target reflects the idea that the
true central bank’s target hardly remains constant over time. This seems to
4To that extent, a clear explanation is given in Clarida, Gal´ı and Gertler (1999) and
Svensson and Woodford (2003).
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hold, for example, in the case of the Federal Reserve, which does not have
any explicit inflation target. In a recent paper, Ireland (2007) estimates a
New Keynesian model able to capture the behavior of the Federal Reserve’s
unobserved inflation target. His results show that that the target rose from
1.25% in 1959 to 8% in the last years of the 70s before falling back below
2.5% in 2004. In this exercise, the time-varying inflation target has a lagged
component and it is function of both supply shocks5 and a purely exogenous
shock to the inflation target. The estimation provides evidence in favor of a
relevant contribution of supply shocks, even if it is not possible to reject the
null hypothesis according to which the movements in the inflation target are
purely random6.
Information structure is the following: the central bank and the private
sector are assumed to share the same incomplete information set on potential
output. Such incompleteness stems from the noise present in observing
potential output and the consequent difficulty in distinguishing cost-push
shocks from potential output shocks. An asymmetric feature regards the
central bank’s inflation target, which is not perfectly known by the private
sector. Transparency is therefore related to how the private sector perceives
intended output, the central bank’s policy instrument, which is related to
the true inflation target. More specifically, the private sector is assumed to
receive a signal ψt of y
I
t satisfying the following condition:
yIt = ψt + χt (7)
ψt is independent of χt, which is assumed to be a mean-zero normal shock.
The private sector observes the central bank’s signal ψt: the more trans-
parent the central bank is about the signal, the better will be the private
5The supply shocks are connected to the New Keynesian model used as the reference
model constituting the theoretical background of the estimation. In particular, the supply
shocks are linked to the elasticity of demand for the intermediate goods and the aggregate
technology shocks respectively.
6The policy implication is, hence, that a time-varying inflation target had relevant
implications in terms of actual observed inflation: the American inflation in the 70s would
have been lower if the Federal Reserve had maintained a constant inflation target.
6
sector’s perception about the central bank’s intended output and its true
inflation target.
In the following section we characterize the problem in state-space form
and we derive the solution of the model in terms of: a) the central bank’s
optimal policy and estimation of the state of the economy and b) the private
sector’s estimation of the state of the economy and the inflation target. The
latter, in turn, will depend upon the degree of central bank transparency.
3 State-space form and model solution
The model described in the previous sections can be summarized in a canon-
ical state-space representation with three blocks. The first block character-
izes the economy according to a VAR representation; the second contains
the loss criterion and the third block the measurement equation.
3.1 State-space form
The economy can be described by[
Xt+1
Etπt+1
]
= A
[
Xt
πt
]
+ByIt + Cuut+1 (8)
where X t is a vector containing the predetermined variables yt, s t, ηt and
π∗t .
yIt is the intended policy which corresponds to output unless for a shock
ηt and, finally, ut+1 is a composite vector of structural shocks with covariance
matrix given by Σu. All the matrices are of appropriate dimensions.
The period loss function is a quadratic form of the goal variables Y t in
which W is a positive-semidefinite weight matrix:
Y t = C
[
Xt
πt
]
+ Cyy
I
t C ≡
[
0 0 0 −1 1
−1 0 1 0 0
]
Cy ≡
[
0
1
]
(9)
where W ≡ 12
[
1 0
0 α
]
so that the policy maker aims at minimizing the
loss function Lt ≡ Y
′
tWY t.
7
The third block deals with the measurement equation:
Z t = D
[
Xt
πt
]
+Σit (10)
The matrix D selects the elements of the vectors X t and πt which can
be observed; the central bank, in fact, can observe inflation target without
noise, while potential output is observed with a noise νt. On the other hand,
the private sector has a different information set than the central bank since
its measurement error of potential output is still given by νt, but it does
not observe the inflation target. In (10), the i over the matrix Σt indicates
that the the measurement errors are different for the private sector and the
central bank because of the different information sets available to each of
them.
In two very different environments, Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002) and
Svensson and Woodford (2004) have shown that when there exists asym-
metric information between the private sector and the policy-maker, the
estimation of the state of the economy depends on the policy followed by
the central bank. The solution is therefore more complex than in the case
with symmetric partial information. However, we know from Svensson and
Woodford (2004) that the certainty equivalence principle holds. Hence, the
policy set up by the central bank does not depend on the information struc-
ture available, and in particular it does not depend on the shocks represented
in the state-space form.
3.2 Non-inertial policy rule and signal-extraction problems
In order to solve the signal-extraction problem for both the agents involved
in the model, we first need to solve the policy problem. We concentrate
on a discretionary, non-inertial equilibrium as in Faust and Svensson (2001,
2002). In this case, the central bank follows a linear rule where its intended
output is a function of the contemporary states of the economy:
yIt = γ1st + γ2yt + γ3ηt + γ4π
∗
t (11)
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The private sector has to learn the time-varying policy target without ob-
serving yIt and π̂t directly. This learning process will be contingent on the
signal ψt on the intended output received by the private sector. Since π̂t
and yIt are unobserved by the private sector, we can go through (11) and
(7) and solve the estimation-problem.
The variable
γ1st + γ2yt + γ3ηt − ψt (12)
would allow to pin down the observation of inflation target if monetary
policy is fully transparent. In this case, in fact, χt → 0, hence the signal ψt
coincides with the intended output and, in turn, the difference between (12)
and (11) amounts to −γ4π
∗
t .
Since the inflation target is not observable, however, (12) minus (11)
includes also an error term, given by χt. Therefore, for a given policy (11)
chosen by the central bank, the private sector will infer the inflation target
by using the following expression:
ιt = −γ4π
∗
t + χt (13)
Notice that the private sector’s inference about the inflation target de-
pends on the central bank decision to reveal its intended output. In other
words, it is not necessary for the central bank to explicitly reveal π̂t in order
to be transparent about its inflation target
Solving this policy problem, we get a policy function, i.e. a matrix
F constituted by the γ coefficients in (11) and a matrix G which links
inflation to the states of the economy. We can plug these two matrices into
(8) and then combine the resulting state-space form with the corresponding
relevant measurement equation. The latter will be different if we analyze
the signal-extraction problem of the central bank or of the private sector.
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The measurement equation for the central bank is given by:
ZCBt =
[
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0
]

yt
st
ηt
π∗t
πt

+
[
νt
0
]
(14)
whereas, for the private sector it will be the following:
ZPSt =
[
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −γ4 0
]

yt
st
ηt
π∗t
πt

+
[
νt
χt
]
(15)
4 Parametrization and numerical results
Faust and Svensson (2001) show how to derive an analytical expression
for the policy coefficients using the methods of undetermined coefficients.
However, to study the properties of the model and evaluate the effect of
varying the degree of transparency, they had to follow numerical methods.
We will solve the model numerically. Our calibration relies on standard
numerical values in the literature (see Woodford, 2003, and Giordani and
So¨derlind, 2004). The discount factor β is set equal to 0.99, the degree of
price stickiness ω is set equal to 0.66. We set the coefficient of constant
relative risk aversion equal to 2 and the inverse of labor-supply elasticity
equal to 1.5: hence, the implied value for κ is 3.5.7 The autoregressive
7The slope coefficient of the new Keynesian Phillips curve can be expressed according
to the following representation:
(1− ω)(1− βω)
ω
(σ + φ)
where σ stands for the coefficient of relative risk aversion and φ is the inverse of labor
supply elasticity.
10
coefficient of potential output is assumed to be 0.7, while for both the cost-
push and the demand shock we pick a value of 0.4. The autoregressive
coefficient for the inflation target is 0.05, a value consistent with the evidence
of Ireland’s estimates about the statistical properties of the time-varying
inflation target for the Federal Reserve. Furthermore, we think that even
in presence of a constant inflation target, as in the case of the European
Central Bank, there can be phases in which it is not possible to strictly
adhere to the target because of extraordinary external shocks.
Given this set of structural parameters, we simulate the stochastic prop-
erties of the shocks and the measurement errors. We solve the model for
100,000 draws of a uniform distribution for the variance of potential output,
cost-push shock, demand shock and the inflation target. Specifically, we
let
[
σ2g , σ
2
ε , σ
2
µ, σ
2
ζ
]
∈ [0, 5], while the measurement shocks are simulated in
a different way depending if we are considering the central bank’s or the
private sector’s perspective. Since the central bank is assumed to observe
the inflation target, we capture its uncertainty about potential output by
taking 100,000 points drawn uniformly from the parameter space [0, 5].
With respect to the private sector, we take the same values drawn before
for the central bank and derive the values for σ2χ as a function of the central
bank’s degree of transparency. Namely, we define the degree of transparency
τ ≡
σ2
ψ
σ2
ψ
+σ2χ
and compute inversely the value of σ2χ =
σ2
ψ
(1−τ)
τ
. Of course, for
high levels of transparency (i.e. τ → 1), σ2ψ coincides with σ
2
η, while the less
transparent the central bank is, the less informative is ψt about the intended
policy yIt . We distinguish three regimes of transparency and for each of
them we draw 100,000 points from a uniform distribution and, in turn, for
the value of σ2χ. In particular, we consider a low level of transparency for
τ ∈ [0, .3], a medium level of transparency if τ ∈ (.3, .6] and finally a high
level of transparency when τ ∈ (.6, 1]. For each of these parameter spaces,
we draw 100,000 points uniformly and then compute residually the value
of σ2χ before computing the loss functions. Then the model is solved both
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for the central bank and the private sector. The average values of all the
losses computed for these draws are shown in Table 1: the loss function for
the central bank turns out to be independent of the degree of transparency,
while that of the private sector is computed for each of the three different
levels of central bank transparency.
As these loss functions can be considered a natural measure of welfare for
the households8, we compare the outcomes arising when the central bank
decides to be more or less transparent. Table 1 shows that, given a loss
function equal to 267.11 for the central bank, the private sector is better off
when it is able to disentangle the error component in the instrument set by
the central bank. In fact, the loss function for the private sector amounts to
317.44 for the first range of transparency that we consider; it is sufficient to
increase the degree of transparency to the range (.3, .6] to make the private
sector better off, since in this case loss drops to 306.57, a value which is fur-
ther reduced in the most transparent regime we examine: specifically, when
τ ∈ (.6, 1] the loss amounts to 285.44. Increasing transparency, therefore,
is beneficial in terms of the private sector’s welfare, as it is also confirmed
by solving the model for extreme values in the degree of transparency: with
a regime which is not transparent at all, the loss function for the private
sector reaches its maximum value, while a completely transparent regime al-
lows the private sector to reach almost the same welfare level as the central
bank, the difference being due only to the partial observation of the infla-
tion target 9. Similarly to what found by Faust and Svensson (2001), higher
transparency may improve the outcome of discretionary policy. However,
our result has been derived in a completely different setup, where agents
are forward-looking and the central bank does not have any incentive to
create unexpected inflation. On the other hand, Faust and Svensson’s anal-
ysis is conducted entirely in a backward-looking model, where there exists
8In particular, Woodford (2003) derives a loss function like (5) as a second-order ap-
proximation of the representative household’s utility.
9Namely, even without measurement error, private sector observes a fraction γ4 of pi
∗
t .
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a specific role for central bank’s credibility. Faust and Svensson show that
increasing transparency makes the discretionary policy closer to the social
optimum by assuming that the central bank responds to both the actual
time-varying policy target and the private sector’s perception of the target.
In our setup, we solve a standard DSGE model under discretion and show
that a more transparent regime is beneficial for the private sector even in
presence of incomplete information on potential output. The latter finding
suggests a reflection about a common claim according to which if the central
bank has limited knowledge of the state of the economy, it would help to
be more opaque in order to make the private sector react less than it would
do in case of explicit announcements about policy objectives, forecasts and
policies. Here, we interpret the notion of transparency as related to how
easily policy intentions can be grasped by the private sector. We show how
the presence of incomplete information, in the form of unobserved potential
output, cannot be considered a good reason for the policymaker to follow a
less transparent regime.
4.1 Alternative scenarios and robustness
In this section, we undertake robustness analysis and check wether our re-
sults hold true when considering a) heterogeneity in the information set
within the private sector, and b) heterogeneity in the information set be-
tween the central bank and the private sector with respect to observation of
potential output.
We believe it is worthy to consider the effects of different information
sets within the private sector for two reasons. First, following Cornand and
Heinemann (2006) and Walsh (2007), it is possible that partial release of
information, a` la Morris and Shin (2002), is beneficial. In case of wide re-
lease of information, the economic agents are induced to coordinate their
expectations by taking into account the public information released by the
policymaker: this can make the economy too sensitive to any noise in the
public information itself. This information cost, however, can be limited if
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the central bank decides to provide information only to a fraction of agents
because a low level of publicity reduces the incentive to overreact to the
public signal, as the latter reaches only a fraction of agents. Second, partial
release of information may be interpreted as a particular kind of rational
inattention: even if the central bank disseminates its public signal to ev-
eryone without any discrimination within the private sector, only a fraction
of agents incorporate the new information into their decisions. As a con-
sequence, this strand of literature finds an optimal degree of transparency
which does not generally coincide with full transparency. Taking that into
account, we perform the following experiment: for each given degree of
transparency τ , only a fraction P of agents in the private sector observes
the inflation target as a function of the degree of transparency. Appendix B
shows in detail how we introduce heterogeneity in the private sector, while
here we report graphically the effects of differentiating the information set
within the private sector. Again, we simulate the model for the same val-
ues of shocks and measurement errors in the interval [0, 5], considering, as
above, three regimes of transparency and P ∈ [0, 1]. Introducing hetero-
geneity within the private sector’s information set should not be confused
with varying the degree of central bank’s transparency: in this exercise, we
simulate the outcomes for both different levels of transparency and fraction
of informed agents. Then we derive the private sector’s loss function as
a weighted average of the fraction of the loss of informed and uninformed
households. We believe that this experiment allows to overcome a limit in
the literature about policy transparency. Up to now, many contributions,
(including Walsh (2007)), justified the presence of a fraction of uninformed
agents by invoking rational inattention a` la Sims, and considered the latter
as a perfect substitute for low transparency. However, this equivalence is
not obvious, as central bankers may be unable to inform only a fraction of
agents. Figure 1 shows the percentage change in social loss relative to the
case of full transparency.
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We find that partial release of information is never optimal, unlike some
previous results in the literature. In figure 1 the slope of the relative change
in social loss monotonically increases with the degree of transparency. Un-
der low transparency the cost of having only a fraction of informed agents
is almost constant since even the informed agents observe π∗t very noisily.
Under high transparency, on the contrary, the relative loss decreases rapidly
as a the information released by the central bank can improve significantly
the learning process by the part of private sector. Therefore, providing in-
formation about the policy target reduces global uncertainty and, in turn,
increases social welfare, in line with Faust and Svensson (2001, 2002), Svens-
son (2006) and Woodford (2005)10.
We believe that there exists another reason why, in the present setup, be-
ing completely transparent enhances social welfare without any cost in terms
of excessive sensitivity to the public signal. The private sector’s information
set has been modeled as a subset of the central bank’s one; specifically, given
that the central bank has incomplete information about potential output,
the private sector shares this kind of incomplete information and, further-
more, does not perfectly observe the inflation target. Therefore, by releasing
a precise signal about the inflation target, the private sector’s loss decreases.
However, information released by the central bank can be noisy, due to the
imperfect knowledge about both the structure of and the shocks affecting the
economy. For robustness purposes, we analyze whether these results hold
under the assumption that the private sector is better informed on potential
output. Such new informative asymmetry could reintroduce a problem of
excessive reaction to public signals and reduce incentives for central bank
transparency. We simulate the model for different degrees of uncertainty in
the measurement of potential output. We take the same 100,000 values of
10In our setup, differently from Morris and Shin (2002) and other contributions, public
information is not a focal point for private actions, because private agents are not forced
to coordinate on the public signal, neglecting private information even if the latter is more
accurate than the former. Nevertheless, Woodford (2005) and Svensson (2006) show the
fragility of the Morris and Shin results to some relevant points like changing the welfare
measure, or by calibrating their model with more realistic parameters.
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σ2ν ∈ [0, 5] for the central bank, while for the private sector we take 100,000
values in the uniform distribution ∈ [0, 2.5]. We assume that the private
sector’s forecast about potential output is a linear combination of the signal
received by central bank and its own observation. Under an assumption of
asymmetric information set about potential output by the part of the pri-
vate sector, we reexpress the observation equation (4) must be distinguished
for the central bank and the private sector:
yCBt = yt + ν
CB
t E
(
νCBt
)
= 0 V ar (νt) = σ
2
ν,CB =
1
ϑ
(16)
yPSt = yt + ν
PS
t E
(
νPSt
)
= 0 V ar
(
νPSt
)
= σ2ν,PS =
1
̟
(17)
where ϑ and ̟ indicate the precision of the signals received by central bank
and private sector respectively. Under the assumption of uncertainty about
the quality of the two signals (16) and (17), the private sector’s learning
process uses a linear combination of these:
St = ϕy
CB
t + (1− ϕ) y
PS
t ϕ ≡
ϑ
ϑ+̟
(18)
Table 2 shows the numerical properties of this modification to our base-
line model, for different levels of transparency as defined above. We still
obtain that the private sector’s loss is decreasing in the degree of central
bank transparency, even when the private sector’s signal on potential out-
put is more precise.
Finally, in Figure 2 we show the percentage change in social loss relative
to the case of full transparency as a function of the number of informed
agents. The message remains coherent with that of Figure 1 above. Social
welfare improves when all the agents are informed. Hence, it is not sufficient
to assume that the private sector about potential output to modify the
conclusion in favor of full transparency and full release of information.
5 Concluding remarks
In the last two decades we have observed a sharp increase in the degree of
central bank transparency. In this paper, we justify this choice by numer-
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ically simulating a DSGE model featuring uncertainty on potential output
and imperfect knowledge of the central bank’s inflation target by the private
sector. Our welfare criterion includes a stochastic inflation target, following
the analysis of Ireland (2007). We assume that private sector does not ob-
serve the inflation target and it observes a noisy measure of potential output,
identical to what observed by the central bank. If the central bank follows
a non-inertial optimal policy, the private sector’s estimation of the state of
the economy also depends on the degree of central bank transparency.
Under higher transparency, private sector’s forecasts become more ac-
curate and its welfare increases. This finding is robust to assuming hetero-
geneity of the information set within the private sector, unlike some previous
examples in the literature (Cornand and Heinemann (2006), Walsh (2007)).
Moreover, it also holds when the private sector is assumed to have better
information on potential output with respect to the central bank.
From a methodological point of view, the major contribution of the paper
is to extend the analysis of informational asymmetries in a DSGE model to
the case of an unobservable policy goal.
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A Derivation of the NKPC
Firms set prices a` la Calvo (1983). Each period a random fraction (1−ω) sets
new prices so that the aggregate price level evolves as a convex combination
of the lagged price level pt−1 and optimal reset prices p̂
∗
t :
pt = (1− ω)p̂
∗
t + ωpH,t−1 (19)
For the price-adjusting firms, the optimal reset price will be equal to the
expected discounted value of current and future nominal marginal cost mct,
markup µ and a cost-push shock st affecting the firm’s desired price:
p̂∗t = (1− ωβ)
∞∑
i=0
(ωβ)iEt (mct+i + st+i) + µ (20)
The previous expression can be written in a more compact form:
p̂∗t − pt−1 = ωβEt
(
p̂∗t+1 − pt
)
+ πt + (1− ωβ) (m̂ct + st) m̂ct ≡ mct + µ
(21)
Under the price structure for pt, a log-linear version of the domestic price
inflation around a zero inflation steady state is
πt = (1− ω) (p̂
∗
t − pt−1) (22)
which, combined with equation (21) gives
πt = βEtπt+1 +
(1− ωβ)(1− ω)
ω
(m̂ct + st) (23)
Assuming that real marginal costs m̂ct are linearly correlated to output gap,
m̂ct = κ (yt − yt) we arrive at equation (1) in the main text.
B Different information sets within the private
sector
In this section we show formally how we introduce heterogeneity in the
information sets of the private sector. Specifically, we assume that a fraction
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P does not observe the inflation target, while the rest of agents observes π̂t,
at least partially, as a function of the degree of transparency. As stressed
in section 4, the observed inflation target is deeply dependent on how much
transparent central bank is, according to
σ2χ =
σ2ψ (1− τ)
τ
so that for extreme degrees of transparency, the signal delivered by central
bank will reflect perfectly the true inflation target Accordingly, the mea-
surement equation for the informed part and the uninformed part will be
respectively:
Z It =
[
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −γ4 0
] [
Xt
πt
]
+
 νt
σ2
ψ
(1−τ)
τ
 (24)
ZUt =
[
1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −γ4 0
][
Xt
πt
]
+
[
νt
χt|τ−→0
]
(25)
The loss function for the private sector will be function of the fraction
of informed and uninformed agents, hence it will be a weighted average of
the loss for the informed part and the uninformed part, with weights equal
to P and (1− P ).
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Table 1: Numerical simulation
Regime Central Bank’s Loss Private Sector’s Loss
0 ≤ τ < 0.3 267.1082 317.4385
0.3 < τ ≤ 0.6 267.1082 306.5697
0.6 < τ ≤ 1 267.1082 285.4359
τ = 0 267.1082 320.8341
τ = 1 267.1082 267.1125
Table 2: Numerical simulation with private sector having a more precise
signal about potential output
Regime Private Sector’s Loss
0 ≤ τ < 0.3 294.8310
0.3 < τ ≤ 0.6 284.6931
0.6 < τ ≤ 1 262.9250
τ = 0 298.2852
τ = 1 244.2209
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Figure 1: The effect of having different levels of informed agents on social
loss (percent change relative to having full transparency for the entire private
sector)
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Figure 2: The effect of having different levels of informed agents on social loss
with different perception of the potential output between the central bank
and the private sector (percent change relative to having full transparency
for the entire private sector)
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